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Is the California prison system so overcrowded as to require a reduction in
population in order for the state to comply with its constitutional obligation
not to be "deliberately indifferent" to the known medical needs of prisoners?'
Is the phrase "under God," added in the 1950s to the Pledge of Allegiance,
unconstitutional?' When does the First Amendment protect the speech of
AUTHOR. Judith Resnik is the Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School, all rights
reserved. Thanks are due to Denny Curtis, who joined me in some of the reading of Reinhardt,
as he does in friendships with Stephen Reinhardt, Ramona Ripston, Stanton Wheeler, Marcia
Chambers, and Rachel and Stephen Wizner. Help also came from several of Judge Reinhardt's
former and future law clerks including Joshua Civin, Stella Burch Elias, Talia Inlender, and
Daniel Winik; from Heather Gerken, Ben Sachs, Lucas Guttentag, and Reva Siegel; and from
Yale Law School students Victoria Degtyareva, Jason Glick, Matthew Pearl, and Brian Holbrook.
Special acknowledgment is needed of the remarkable friendship between Stan Wheeler and
Stephen Reinhardt, who shared years together as undergraduates at Pomona College, a love of
Yale Law School and of Los Angeles, deep concern for individuals in the criminal justice system,
and broad commitments to social justice and racial equality. Were Stan alive, he would be
leading this band of appreciation for Stephen Reinhardt's contributions. I in turn am grateful
that The Yale Law journal has provided me the opportunity to reflect on Judge Reinhardt's
achievements.
1. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, Col-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *76
(E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); see also Order To Reduce Prison Population, Nos.
CIV S-90-o52o LKK JFM P, Col-13 51 TEH, 2010 WL 99000 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2010), appeal granted and jurisdictional consideration postponed sub nom. Schwarzenegger v.
Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413 (2010).
2. See Newdow v. Rio Linda United Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9 th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting). Prior decisions in that litigation include Newdow v. United States Congress, 328
F-3d 466 (9 th Cit. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
539
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
government employees?' How long can the federal government hold an
immigrant in detention after that person is ordered to leave the United States?'
These questions have come to the fore of constitutional jurisprudence in part
through decisions by Stephen Reinhardt, appointed in 1980 by President
Jimmy Carter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
But to focus only on cases that have made headlines is to miss the bulk of
Judge Reinhardt's work. According to one database, from January of 2005
through July of 2010, Judge Reinhardt participated in more than fifteen
hundred decisions.' My reading of Reinhardt takes but a slice of this large
corpus addressing human relations and legal obligations that is, as detailed
below, a jurisprudence of facticity. His lengthy opinions are dense with the
experiences of individuals who, while rights-holders, sometimes encounter
inattentive judges and ineffective lawyers.
Yet, despite his own documentation of law's failures, Judge Reinhardt
remains optimistic about law's power to cabin officialdom's misbehavior.
Judge Reinhardt reads the U.S. Constitution as purposefully protective of
individuals in their encounters with government. When doing so, Reinhardt is
well aware that he lives in an era where, as he put it, many of his cohort prize
"'efficiency' . . . and 'judicial economy"' and therefore rebuff claimants in the
name of those goals. Reinhardt instead argues that his -and other judges'-
rulings ought to be animated by efforts to enhance "justice and liberty."6
Absent sustained ethnographic case studies of many judges and
complementary econometrics, one cannot know how unusual Judge
Reinhardt's output is. What can be seen is that his judgments illustrate the
choices entailed in exercising the "judicial voice."' Judge Reinhardt's work thus
3. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3 d 1168 (9 th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.), rev'd, 547 U.S. 410
(20o6).
4. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, J.), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2oo).
5. See Litigation History Report: Stephen Reinhardt, WESTLAw, http://www.westlaw.com
(open any decision of Judge Reinhardt, follow "Litigation History Report" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 20, 2010). The list of more than 1700 cases included summary dispositions. To
invoke this database is not to endorse its count or method but to provide one metric.
6. Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9 th Cir. 2009) (Reinhardt, J.).
7. A wealth of materials, relying on diverse methodologies and analytics, considers theories of
the judge, interpretation, narrative styles, preferences, collegial interactions, and patterns of
judgment. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); LEE EPSTEIN, THOMAS G. WALKER, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (4 th ed. 2007);
RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); Aharon Barak, Forcuor: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 25 (2002); Robert
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provides a contemporary counterpart to what Renaissance Europe called
"exempla virtutis" -allegorical narratives of a person's deeds exemplifying
attributes seen as virtuous. A subset, "exempla iustitiae," identified traits
particularly admirable for judges."
What was desirable then? Renaissance justice stories stressed judicial
loyalty to the state and subservience to ruling powers. Town halls were
adorned, for example, with pictorial renditions of the Roman Brutus, who
ordered the slaying of his own sons because of their treason against the
Republic. Also portrayed was the Greek Zaleucus, who gouged out one of his
own eyes as he also imposed that punishment on his son for violating the law.'
The messages were autocratic and patriarchal, insistent on obedience to the law
even at the cost of inflicting pain on one's family members and oneself.
Moreover, whenever judges breached their obligations, kingly powers would
mete out punishments to warn judges against going awry. Another regularly
shown picture was that of a son forced to sit as a new judge on the skin of his
father, who had accepted a bribe and was flayed alive at the direction of a
ruler.10
Today, as democratic precepts have radically changed their obligations,
judges are no longer posited as servants of the state but are, instead, admired
for different traits. Judges are both prohibited from sitting in judgment of their
relatives and protected from kingly oversight through norms of judicial
independence. Further, judges must now listen to all persons and treat them
fairly and equally. Yet the older idea -of virtue exemplified - remains a useful
A. Ferguson, Rhetorics of the Judicial Opinion: The judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Judith
Resnik, Constructing the Canon, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221 (1990). Efforts are underway to
expand systematic studies of judicial role and behavior through various collaborative
research projects and newly formed organizations. See, e.g., THE LAW AND Soc'Y Ass'N,
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH NETWORKS, http://www.lawandsociety.org/ (follow
"Collaborative Research Networks" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (including
research networks on "Gender and Judging" and on "Civil Justice and Disputing
Behavior"); UNIv. COLLEGE LONDON, JUDICIAL STUDIES INSTITUTE,
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/ index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
8. See Hugo van der Velden, Cambysesfor Example: The Origins and Function of an Exemplum
lustitiae in Netherlandish Art of the Fifieenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 23 SIMIOLUS:
NETHERLANDS QFOR THE HIST. OF ART 5 (1995).
9. Amsterdam's Town Hall of 1655 included both. That imagery is reproduced and analyzed in
JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND
RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES To DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 38-61 (2011).
i0. A particularly graphic diptych could be found in the fifteenth-century Town Hall of Bruges.
See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images offustice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1737-38 figs.5a & sb
(1987).
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way to think about what one wants from judges. Below I examine different
metrics by which to assess the voice, visibility, and jurisprudence of judges and
explore the facets of Judge Reinhardt's decisions that make him worthy-per
the Renaissance tradition -of imitation.
I. LEGAL PRESENCES AND ABSENCES
Many Reinhardt decisions bring individuals into focus. One such person is
Juan Antonio Perez, who came from Mexico "without inspection" into the
United States and then sought asylum." At issue was the legal import of
Perez's belated arrival for his asylum hearing. To understand the doctrinal and
theoretical import of the decision requires knowing what happened one
morning in Los Angeles.
Having appeared at his first immigration court proceeding in a timely
fashion, Perez was late to a second hearing because "his car overheated in the
middle of rush hour traffic."" After making his way by bus, Perez arrived two
hours past the appointed time. As Judge Reinhardt recounts: "When Perez
entered the courtroom, around 11:oo AM, the IJ [immigration judge] was still
on the bench. Perez approached the IJ's assistant and handed her his notice of
the removal hearing. At that moment, the IJ stood and left the courtroom." 3
The administrative assistant told Perez that the judge was "'done for the
day"' -but as it turned out, not quite: on the same day, the immigration judge
ordered Perez "removed in absentia."'4
Was Perez absent? Is that a physical fact, a psychological (if not existential)
experience, a discretionary judgment, or a legal ruling? Non-lawyers might not
pause long over these questions, for absence is commonly understood to be the
antithesis of presence," and Perez and the immigration judge shared a physical
space-the same courtroom -on the day of the hearing.
Yet "in absentia" is also a legal concept, encountered with some regularity
in the criminal context. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial
n1. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3 d 770 (9 th Cir. 2008).
12. Id. at 772. Judge Reinhardt wrote the panel decision, joined by Judge Betty Fletcher. The
dissent, by Judge Pamela Rymer, characterized the facts as uncertain; the agency lacked
record evidence as to "when Perez arrived at court, or what was going on when he got
there." Id. at 775 n.1 (Rymer, J., dissenting). Judge Rymer would have denied the petition
for review on that basis alone. Id. at 776 n.1. The government is not reported by the dissent
or the majority to have disputed the facts described by the majority.
13. Id. at 773 (majority opinion).
14. Id.
15. See 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 46 (2d ed. 1989).
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cannot proceed if a defendant is not present at its beginning," and hence
courts have debated how to respond to no-shows, as well as whether to draw
distinctions between a defendant's "flight before and flight during a trial"" or
thereafter. The current doctrine is that courts may decline adjudication if
defendants flee while appeals are pending. Thus, a defendant loses whatever
claims existed.' But that sanction is to be mitigated if the legal claims of a
"former fugitive" are unrelated to the flight.'9
Unlike trials, with confrontation and presentment rights requiring
physically present participants, appellate review does not directly involve
litigants, who often do not attend oral arguments. Why, then, impose
sanctions for a criminal defendant absent when an appeal is to be decided?
Enforcement of judgments is one answer. Were an appellate court to uphold a
conviction and sentencing or to reverse and remand for new proceedings,
neither judgment could take effect without a defendant.2 o Courts dismissing
"fleeing fugitive appeals" also explain their holdings in terms of deterrence and
an "interest in efficient, dignified appellate" process" that would be
undermined by the "disrespect" of flight."
Yet these various concerns are to be balanced against the potential that the
loss of appellate review could result in a person "serving a sentence that under
law was erroneously imposed."" Orderly process, procedural regularity, and
respect for the institutions of adjudication could well demand a litigant's
presence, but draconian penalties sometimes must be limited so as to focus on
16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. A defendant can, however, be deemed to have "waived" the right to
a "continued presence" if voluntarily absenting him or herself "after the trial has begun."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c).
17. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993).
18. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam) ("While ... an escape
does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy ... it disentitles
the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.").
19. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 240 (1993) (delineating the parameters of
the "fugitive dismissal rule"). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, O'Connor,
and Thomas, dissented.
20. See Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
Both opinions were referenced by Justice Stevens in Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 239-42.
21. Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 242 (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975)).
22. Id. at 246 (quoting Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cit. 1986)).
23. Estelle, 420 U.S. at 544. The "dismissal of fugitive appeals is always discretionary," as being a
fugitive "does not 'strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy."'
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 250 n.23 (quoting Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366).
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the underlying legality of decisions. On occasion, the Supreme Court has
vacated the dismissal of an appeal based on the absence of the appellant.'
How might these ideas be translated into the immigration context,
conceived as a "civil" rather than a "criminal" proceeding? What are the stakes
in refusing to hear a person who has absconded, as contrasted with one who is
present but late to a hearing? What magnitude of discretion ought to be
accorded administrative judges?
These questions, exemplified by Perez, are moored in federal statutes that
require appearances and recognize limited justifications for absences. Upon a
failure to appear, a person shall "be ordered removed in absentia if the
[Immigration] Service establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that ... written notice [of the hearing] was . .. provided and that the
alien is removable."" A removal order precludes not only an opportunity to
raise legal claims to remain but also the possibility that an immigration judge
could authorize a "voluntary departure." For those permitted to depart
voluntarily, return under certain circumstances may be available, whereas a
removal order can bar reentry for ten or more years.2 But even if a person is
found to have been "in abstentia," reopening is an option under "exceptional
circumstances," defined as those beyond the immigrant's control and
exemplified in the statute by "battery or extreme cruelty" or "serious illness"
befalling an immigrant or her immediate family, and by no "less compelling
circumstances."2 7
The statute speaks of failures to appear but not belated arrivals. One could,
however, read the words "appear" to mean that the alien must appear at a time
fixed, rather than as being physically present in the appointed place. In
immigration decisionmaking, "in absentia" appears (to borrow that word) to
have taken on that meaning and to be regularly conflated with being late-
albeit without much by way of statutory interpretation or reference to the law
on fleeing fugitives. Reported decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) rely on tardiness to order removal "in absentia."" Appellate courts
24. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 239-52.
25. 8 U.S.C. § 229a(b)(5)(A) (2006).
26. Id. § 182(a)(9)(A) (20o6).
27. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9 th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 229a(b)(5)(C)(i),
(e) (i)).
28. One case holding that lateness rendered that person "in absentia" noted that the respondent
had "waited outside the courtroom for his attorney to arrive" but concluded that "the
respondent ha[d] not indicated that he was instructed by his attorney or anyone else to not




sometimes reverse (by delineating factors constituting "mitigating
circumstances" to distinguish a particular lateness from ordinary
"tardiness" 9), while at other times they approve the administrative removal
orders."o Given the reported decisions, data from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review-that thirty-nine percent of noncitizens failed to appear
for removal hearings in 2oo6"-may well include some unknown number of
late arriving respondents alongside those who never came at all.
Where did Mr. Perez's situation fit within the statutory scheme? The
immigration judge ruled that physical presence had not sufficed to negate a
conclusion of Perez's legal absence. The superior administrative body, the BIA,
assistance of counsel. See In re Chaman Singh, No. A72 567 465, 2004 WL 3187212, at *1-2
(B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2004) (unpublished and "cannot be cited").
One can also find decisions forgiving lateness. For example, an immigrant arrived at a
federal building on time "but was not able to enter because of a lengthy security line."
Matter of Bao Di Lin, No. A29 879 052, 25 Immig. Rptr. Bl-77 (Immigration Non-Precedent
Decisions, March 14, 2002) (granting reopening). In contrast, a dissenting board member
argued that " [u]nless we are to apply a per se rule that a late appearance shall not constitute
a non-appearance- something this Board has not previously done-it is hard to see the
Immigration Judge's error in this case." Id. A 1997 three-person BIA panel ruling granted
reopening based on "exceptional circumstances" because respondent's "step-son's illness
was responsible for his i5-minute delay in arriving at his deportation hearing." In re
Kanwaljit Singh, No. A7o 942 039, 21 I. & N. Dec. 998, 1000 (B.I.A. 1997); see also In re
Ismael Vasquez-Palacios, No. A27 621 985, 8 Immig. Rptr. BI-42 (Immigration Non-
Precedent Decision, March 14, 1990) (ordering reopening when respondent and his father
were on time but waited outside the hearing room as another matter was pending).
29. See, e.g., Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F. 3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2oo6) (per curiam) (granting
reopening when Mr. Cabrera-Perez arrived some twenty minutes late and had "likely
entered the courthouse before the IJ left the bench"); Twum v. INS, 411 F-3d 54, 58 (2d Cit.
2005) (remanding after the immigration judge heard no evidence on the claim that "security
guards' refusal to admit him to 26 Federal Plaza" precluded his arrival); Herbert v. Ashcroft,
325 F. 3d 68, 69-70 (1st Cit. 2003) (granting reopening because Mr. Herbert 
was thirty
minutes late due to traffic); Nazarova v. INS, 171 F. 3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1999) (permitting
reopening when Ms. Nazarova explained that she had waited for a translator). The Nazarova
court also noted that the immigration judge had ordered deportation to Russia instead of
the Ukraine, where Ms. Nazarova was from. The judge had assumed that because she spoke
Russian, she came from Russia. See Nazarova, 171 F.3d at 481.
3o. For example, the Eleventh Circuit denied reopening when an immigrant had alleged that he
was a few minutes late to the hearing because he "went to the incorrect location." Pineda v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 186 F. App'x 854, 855 (ilth Cit. 2006) (per curiam).
31. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REv., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at H2 (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyo6syb.pdf; see also Rebecca Feldmann, Note, What
Constitutes Exceptional? The Intersection of Circumstances Warranting Reopening of Removal
Proceedings After Entry of an In Absentia Order of Removal and the Due Process Rights of
Noncitizens, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 219 (2008).
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summarily affirmed. The next stage was the Ninth Circuit, which -because of
the summary BIA affirmance -was to "review only the reasoning presented by
the IJ"32 so as to evaluate whether the refusal to reopen was "arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.""
In the opinion authored by Judge Reinhardt, the Ninth Circuit held that
Perez was not "in absentia" when he was standing -albeit late -in a courtroom
where an immigration judge was sitting. Because, as a matter of law, Perez had
not failed "to appear,"34 the question of "exceptional circumstances" was not
relevant.3 ' The dissenting judge would have found otherwise: "Juan Antonio
Perez was two hours late for his immigration hearing-so late that even his
lawyer had given up and gone home.", 6 But Judge Reinhardt read the
congressional directives on removal "in absentia" to preclude the
administrative apparatus from looking people in the face and deeming them
absent.
II. PERSONAL IMMEDIACY
If one facet of immigration law regulates government practices on
deportation, another addresses government power to hold immigrants. One
issue is what to do when a person, properly deportable, cannot be repatriated.
Hence, another Reinhardt decision begins: "Petitioner Kim Ho Ma is an alien
who left his native land, Cambodia, as a refugee at the age of two and has
resided in the United States as a legal permanent resident since he was six.""
32. Perez, 516 F. 3 d at 773 (quoting Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3 d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2004)).
33. Id. (quoting Singh v. INS, 295 F-3d 1037, 1039 (9 th Cir. 2002)).
34. Id. at 774.
35. Perez's lawyer had conceded that exceptional circumstances did not exist. The majority left
open that question for future cases. See id. at 773-74 & n.2. As discussed in note 29, other
circuits have dealt with lateness by finding mitigation, rather than interpreting the statute as
did the Reinhardt decision to be inapplicable. See generally Feldmann, supra note 31.
In another context, Judge Reinhardt addressed the discretion of federal trial judges in
dealing with requests for continuance when a defendant had diligently presented the
request, no findings of inconvenience to the government were made, and prejudice to the
defendant resulted. See United States v. Kloehn, Nos. o6-50456, 07-50274, 2010 WL 3385542
(9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2010). That majority decision reversed a conviction because a trial judge
"refused to continue the trial for two days to allow [the defendant] to see his dying son." Id.
at *3. Below, the defendant then waived his right of presence and left the trial, and his son
died an hour after he arrived. Id. at *4.
36. Perez, 516 F. 3 d at 775 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
37. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis,




Because he had committed a crime, however, the government sought to deport
him at the end of his prison sentence. Ordered removed because of the
conviction, Kim Ho Ma was held after the end of his sentence because, without
a repatriation agreement between Cambodia and the United States, the United
States had no place to send him ("and hundreds of others like him"). * The
government asserted that it could hold him "in detention indefinitely.""
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, construing the relevant statute to permit
detaining a person for only a "reasonable period."4o Like the Ninth Circuit, a
majority of the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention with "no
reasonable likelihood of . . . removal in the foreseeable future" was
impermissible." In Kim Ho Ma's case, the Court remanded to determine the
"likelihood of successful future negotiations" for repatriation.42
The narrative structure of the Kim Ho Ma decision, like that of the Perez
opinion, exemplifies a common feature of many Reinhardt opinions. He starts
with a person's circumstances,4 some of which are poignant, some veering
toward Kafka, and others unappealing (pun intended), in that the person is
alleged to have (and in some cases has been found to have) visited grievous
harm on others. Immigration decisions are one template; another is
postconviction relief. Reinhardt opinions often center on individuals who
encounter the "Law" -as embodied in police officers, prosecutors, immigration
officials, lawyers, administrative judges, and courthouse judges. Law, in these




41. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court. Two dissents were filed, one
by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Scalia and Thomas in
part, id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and the other by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting). All of the dissenters shared the view that the
Attorney General had "statutory authority to detain criminal aliens with no specified time
limit." Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's separate comments were directed at
Justice Kennedy's view that courts might in some situations order release. Id.
42. Id. at 702 (majority opinion).
43. Another example is United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 568 F. 3 d 1139, 1140-46 (9th Cir. 2009),
in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the indictment based on
the invalidity of the initial deportation order. Judge Reinhardt's opinion began:
"Edmundo Lopez-Velasquez waived his right to appeal and was deported in 1994 in a group
proceeding in which the immigration judge (IJ) did not advise him of the availability of
relief from deportation . . . . He had a United States citizen wife and two young United
States citizen children . . . and would surely have been a strong candidate for discretionary
relief [then available]." Id. at 1140-41.
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toward individuals -like Juan Perez and Kim Ho Ma-who may, under
governing legal rules, be eligible to be heard on the merits.
While Judge Reinhardt is sometimes abrupt in print" and in person, he
continues (now in his fourth decade on the bench) to display remarkable
patience with legal and factual nuance in his judgments. He painstakingly
details relevant records (often going beyond excerpts provided in appellate
appendices) and the governing law.45 That intensive investigation documents
inadequacies of lawyerS46 as well as of judges.
Consider, for example, Reinhardt's account of one habeas petitioner's
efforts:
For over eleven years, Kevin Phelps has sought to present his petition
for habeas corpus to a federal judge. For over eleven years, he has been
unsuccessful. Given the trend these last decades on the part of Congress
and the Supreme Court "increasingly to bar the federal courthouse door
to litigants with substantial federal claims," habeas petitioners-
including petitioners who may have suffered severe deprivations of
their constitutional rights-now face myriad procedural hurdles
specifically designed to restrict their access to the once-Great Writ. In
this modern era, which prizes "efficiency," "parity," and "judicial
economy" often at the expense of justice and liberty, it is not at all
unusual for an individual who fails to satisfy one of those many
procedural hurdles to toil on for years in hopeless pursuit of an
opportunity to be heard on the merits of his claim -an opportunity that
he will never receive. It is, however, very unusual for an individual who
meticulously has overcome each of those procedural hurdles to sit in
prison for more than a decade nonetheless, without ever being heard on
44. See, e.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, m116 (9 th Cir. 2010)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Today's majority opinion will undoubtedly be celebrated by a
large number of Americans as a repudiation of activist, liberal, Godless judging. That is its
great appeal; it reaches the result favored by a substantial majority of our fellow countrymen
and thereby avoids the political outcry that would follow were we to reach the
constitutionally required result. Nevertheless, by reaching the result the majority does, we
have failed in our constitutional duty as a court.").
4s. The judge is well known for seeking similarly hard-working clerks. I know from my own
experience that both he and they can be reached many late nights in chambers.
46. See, e.g., Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (2010) ("At the heart of an effective defense is an
adequate investigation. Without sufficient investigation, a defense attorney, no matter how
intelligent or persuasive in court, renders deficient performance and jeopardizes his client's




the substance of his petition. That, however, is exactly what happened
to Kevin Phelps."
As Reinhardt explained, Phelps, accused of murder, had been prosecuted three
times; two juries hung and the third convicted. Phelps was sentenced to a term
of thirty years to life.41 Phelps argued that exculpatory evidence, discovered
after conviction, coupled with ineffective assistance of counsel, entitled him to
a new trial. The opinion then meticulously accounts how misinterpretation of
legal provisions blocked Phelps's access to a decision on the merits.4 9
Several judges ruled that Phelps had missed a statute of limitations for his
habeas filing, in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA).so However, the Ninth Circuit held, Phelps had not-as a
matter of fact and of law-missed the filing; the statute had not run because
Phelps's appeal was pending before the California courts." Indeed, at "each
stage in Phelps's struggle over the past eleven years to have his federal habeas
petition evaluated on the merits," Phelps's "arguments have been much more
than sound - they have been undeniably correct under currently governing law."s2
In fact, Phelps's arguments had often been embraced by higher courts in other
cases only a few months after Phelps's claims had been rejected."
The Phelps decision is a lament, not only in its detail of the errors in his case
but also of a legal regime generating the labyrinth through which Phelps
weaved his way. The period of eleven years in which Mr. Phelps waited for
justice was, Judge Reinhardt commented, "the epitome of our obsession with
47. Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F-3d 1120, 1122-23 (9 th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1072 (2010).
48. Id. at 1124.
49. Id. at 1125.
so. Id. at 1125-29.
s1. Id. at 1125-27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 244(d)(2) (20o6) (providing that AEDPA's provisions are
tolled when a case is pending in state court). Because "Phelps had already suffered extremely
prolonged delay," and the federal district court had had three occasions on which to rule on
a motion for reconsideration, the court decided the reconsideration motion in his favor. 569
F.3 d at 1135-37.
52. 569 F-3 d at 1123.
53. Id. ("Phelps' one and only fault throughout this protracted process, if it can be described as a
'fault' at all, is that his arguments have been overly prescient: On multiple occasions, the
legal arguments that Phelps put forward for why his petition was properly filed were
rejected by the judges before whom he appeared, only to be fully embraced within a matter
of months by judges authoring a more authoritative, controlling opinion in a different
case.").
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form over substance."5 4 ("All of this energy-and, more important to Phelps,
all of this time-has been spent evaluating one procedural question after
another: Was the initial petition filed fifteen days early or fifteen days late?"")
In short-and these sparse excerpts of the decision only hint at the pile of
details supporting the holding-the opinion displays not only a characteristic
and unabashed Reinhardtian cri de coeur for justice, but also Judge Reinhardt's
commitment to documenting the impact of legal barriers and mistakes on
individuals. And Phelps is one of many instances in which Reinhardt
deliberately engages the vocabulary of justice and injustice as he invites his
colleagues to understand the judicial task as facing and fixing injustices.
III.REINHARDT'S OPTIMISM
As the decision in Phelps illustrates, Reinhardt's jurisprudence is replete
with examples of judges who do not focus on the merits of the claims people
bring to them. Reciting facts in a manner more often associated with great trial
judges and less commonly (wrongly or rightly) with appellate courts,
decision upon decision unsparingly details disheartening interactions in a
myriad of settings in which officialdom ignores humanity. Yet, as illustrated by
the Perez ruling that an immigration judge could not find a person who was
physically present to be legally absent, Reinhardt insists on law's presence as a
source of fairness and justice.
Reinhardt repeatedly calls on law to act justly," even when the individuals
invoking legal rights have themselves injured others.'" None of the Reinhardt
54. Id. at 1141.
ss. Id.
56. William Wayne Justice is one such exemplar: his legacy includes the district court decisions
in cases involving the rights of undocumented children to attend public schools and of
Texas prisoners to be housed in constitutionally adequate conditions. See, e.g., Doe v. Plyler,
458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (schooling). The Texas Prison
litigation generated dozens of decisions. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.
Tex. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cit. 1982), amended in part by,
vacated in part by, 688 F.2d 266 ( 5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
57. For example, Judge Reinhardt objected to the holding in Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S.
416 (1996), that, because "Charles Carlisle's lawyer missed a deadline by one day, his
conviction was upheld even though the district judge found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove his guilt." Stephen Reinhardt, Keynote Address, The Role of Social Justice
in Judging Cases, I U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 18, 26 (2003) [hereinafter Reinhardt, Social Justice in
Judging].
58. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9 th Cir. 2001). The panel remanded for a




opinions that I read adopts what Christopher Eisgruber called a posture of
"apology," in which, with a tinge of regret, jurists feel the onus to explain,
justify, and excuse their exercise of judicial review." Rather, Reinhardt
embraces the idea that the U.S. Constitution's central work is to buffer
individuals from the state o and that the Constitution is ever-present in the
encounter between an individual and the state.
As Reinhardt explained in an article written to honor his colleague John
Noonan, the "Constitution is a collective covenant designed to effectuate the
broad purposes outlined in its preamble. ,, Quoting that text, Judge Reinhardt
added emphasis to certain phrases: "We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. ")62
Given his approach, Reinhardt has registered objections to various
doctrinal developments, such as "standing, mootness, ripeness, prejudice,
waiver, estoppel, procedural default, and retroactivity principles," that
diminish the role of the federal judiciary.6" Reinhardt dissented from
concerns - recorded in the 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts- that the
federal judiciary was growing too large and that Congress should be wary of
providing more jurisdiction, creating new causes of action, and chartering
"eligible for a sentence of death." Id. at 970. As the majority recounts, Phillips admitted at
his second penalty-phase trial that he had committed perjury at his first trial, where he had
said he was not at the crime scene. Phillips alleged that a key witness against him had an
undisclosed plea agreement that promised leniency for identifying Phillips as having
committed a murder in the course of a robbery -therefore rendering him eligible to be
sentenced to death. Id. at 972-74. The majority (in an opinion running more than twenty
pages) recounted that Phillips argued that his lawyer's failure to investigate resulted in the
lawyer acceding to a "hopeless" alibi defense rather than advancing a defense based on
evidence relating to which bullets caused the death. Id. at 976-77. The dissent argued that
Phillips had failed to establish cause and prejudice as required to be heard on the claim. Id.
at 990-92 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
s9. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between
Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 3-4 (1993).
6o. Reinhardt, Social Justice in Judging, supra note 57, at 22-23.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 20-21 (quoting the Constitution's preamble). Reinhardt then recorded his objection to
"[o]riginalists" who "skip over these stirring words." Id. at 21.
63. Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 288 (1996) (providing
Judge Reinhardt's remarks made during a panel discussion) [hereinafter Reinhardt, The
Future of the Federal Courts].
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more judgeships.14 Reinhardt broke ranks with many of his colleagues on the
bench by calling for more judges and more access." The unwillingness to
increase the number of judges did not, he wrote, "make a lot of sense to me: we
have more problems, more cases, and more people, but we do not want to have
more judges to keep up with them."66
To cast Judge Reinhardt's posture only by reference to his focus on
individuals, his refusal of apology, and his embrace of jurisdictional obligations
would be to miss another recursive element in the Reinhardt writings -
optimism. Confronted with claims of outrageous injustice, Judge Reinhardt
looks to law as the source of well-being, even in the face of records that make
plain law's oppressions. The case of Falen Gherebi, in detention in the wake of
9/11, provides another example.
Mr. Gherebi came before the Ninth Circuit twice; in both instances, Judge
Reinhardt wrote for the panel. As he explained in an amended ruling, the
question was "whether the Executive Branch may hold uncharged citizens of
foreign nations in indefinite detention in territory under the 'complete
jurisdiction and control' of the United States while effectively denying them
the right to challenge their detention in any tribunal anywhere, including the
courts of the U.S." 67 The answer, from the Ninth Circuit and subsequently
64. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 23, 28
(1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49. The Long Range Plan included more than ninety
recommendations, including that Congress have a presumption against enacting new civil
causes of action with enforcement jurisdiction in federal courts. As the Plan, adopted by the
Judicial Conference, put it: "Congress should be encouraged to conserve the federal courts
as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism." Id. at 88
(Recommendation No. 6); see generally Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning ofArticle III, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924 (2000).
65. Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea To Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52. But see Jon 0. Newman, 1,ooo Judges -The Limit for an Effective
Federal judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983).
66. Reinhardt, The Future of the Federal Courts, supra note 63, at 292; see also id. at 322 ("I am
concerned about a judiciary that is not giving adequate protection to individual rights....
[as its] jurisdiction is being limited more and more.").
67. Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 728 ( 9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Gherebi II]. The Ninth
Circuit had previously heard Mr. Gherebi's case in 2003. See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3 d 1278
(9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Gherebi I], cert. granted and vacated by 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004)
(vacating the judgment and remanding to the Ninth Circuit in light of Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004)). The Reinhardt amended decision analyzed the jurisdictional
precedents and concluded that federal courts had the power to hear the issues raised and
that, in light of Padilla, venue was proper in the District of Columbia, to which the case was
transferred. 374 F.3d at 738-39.
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from the Supreme Court, was "no": federal courts have the authority to
entertain such petitions from detainees at Guantinamo68 and, as the Supreme
Court later concluded, under certain circumstances from citizens detained
abroad.
As recounted in the Ninth Circuit's first Gherebi opinion, in December
2003, the Justice Department lawyer argued that the government was free to
imprison anyone it deemed an "enemy combatant" and that no court had the
power to oversee that detention. As the reported opinion reflects, the panel
asked the lawyer about what the government's position would be "if the claims
were that it was engaging in acts of torture or that it was summarily executing
the detainees."7 o The questions seemed like a "gotcha," aiming to back the
government lawyer into the obvious admission that, of course, the U.S.
Constitution gives such a person a right of access to court. Thus, the appellate
argument would have proceeded by reasoning from that hypothetical to the
question before the panel: what about access to courts for allegedly
unconstitutional indefinite detention?
But the Justice Department lawyer did not answer as anticipated. Instead,
the lawyer replied that no court could hear claims even of torture or of
summary executions. Judge Reinhardt wrote for the panel that, "to our
knowledge, prior to the current detention of prisoners at Guantanamo, the
U.S. government has never before asserted such a grave and startling
proposition."7 ' This view was "so extreme that it raises the gravest concerns
under both American and international law."7
6s. The Ninth Circuit held that "by virtue of the United States' exercise of territorial
jurisdiction over Guantanamo, habeas jurisdiction lies in the present case." Gherebi II, 374
F.3d at 737. The relevant sequence in the U.S. Supreme Court runs from Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See generally Judith Resnik,
Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010).
69. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 19 (2008).
70. Gherebi I, 352 F.3 d at 1299-1300.
7i. Id. at 1300.
72. Id. As for Mr. Gherebi, in 2004, Judge Joyce Hens Green held that the D.C. District Court
could entertain his petition. Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2004). In 2009,
Judge Reggie Walton held that Mr. Gherebi's detention was authorized under the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § (a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009). As of October 15, 2010, Gherebi
remained in his ninth year of detention at Guantinamo. See The Guantinamo Docket: Salem
Abdul Salem Ghereby, N.Y. TIMEs, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/189-
salem-abdul-salem-ghereby#l (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
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About a year later, in 2004, the rhetorical proved real, as people at
Guantinamo began claiming that they had been subjected to torture. It was
revealed that in 2002 the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice
had advised in memoranda-popularly called "The Torture Memos" and now
withdrawn"-on the legal permissibility of the infliction of pain that many of
us understand to entail torture. Those memoranda aspired to give defenses to
persons ordering or imposing such awful practices on persons within America's
control.7 4 And, despite Judge Reinhardt's optimism, in December 2005 and
again in 20o6, Congress sought to limit federal court jurisdiction to entertain
challenges to such actions. 7s Yet the Supreme Court, 5-4, agreed with Judge
Reinhardt on a basic proposition and held for the first time that Congress
unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus. Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush echoes Reinhardt's concerns that law must not be absent
but must instead "call the jailer to account." 6
IV. REGULARLY READ BY, INTER ALIA, THE SUPREME COURT
Turning from the author to the audience, appellate judges aim to have their
understandings of legal obligations and rights read. To assess Judge
Reinhardt's impact entails tracing his work's reception by litigants, as well as
its invocation by other circuit judges (both on his circuit and others), by
district, bankruptcy, magistrate, and administrative judges, and by state courts.
In addition, because government officials are repeatedly before the courts, one
would want to trace responses by legislative and executive branches, both
federal and state, acceding to, embracing, or pressing back against
interpretations and decisions. For example, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger- here standing for various state and local officials because he
is the respondent in the massive California prison litigation I mentioned at the
73. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234oA (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olC/18usc234o234oa2.htm (recounting the withdrawal of the August
2002 "torture memos" and superseding those memoranda in their entirety).
74. Many public databases provide copies of these memos, including those from the Washington
Post and the American Civil Liberties Union. A small portion is reprinted in Resnik, supra
note 68, at 61o fig.6.
75. See Military Commissions Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Detainee
Treatment Act of 2oo5, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Star. 2739.
76. 553 U.S. 723, 745 (20o8).
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outset-should be understood as regularly in legal exchanges with Judge
Reinhardt.
Another prominent interlocutor is the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting in a
hierarchical relationship with the circuits and offering responses readily
quantifiable. The Court's saliency is obvious, and yet, even as I detail some of
the recent exchanges, I must also note concern. Because doing so is relatively
easy, it deflects attention that should be turned to these many other sectors
affected by Judge Reinhardt's decisions but whose readership is much harder
to track.
Within legal circles, a few appellate judges are well known for sending
cases to the Supreme Court through dissents that function as "cert petitions,"
implicitly calling for their colleagues to be overturned. Judge Reinhardt is one
of the high-visibility judges whose majority opinions are also seen as attracting
the Court's attention. Some use that perception as a form of critique rather
than as the compliment it is. Even as members of the Court often disagree with
him, Reinhardt is engaged in an extended discussion with the Justices about
the shape and meaning of American law.
For example, as of July 1, 2010, the Supreme Court had thirty-six cases
from the federal courts on its docket for the upcoming 2010-2011 Term.77 One,
now captioned Schwarzenegger v. Plata and mentioned at the outset, involves a
three-judge court on which Judge Reinhardt sat, along with District Judges
Thelton Henderson and Lawrence Karlton, both of whom had dealt with parts
of the California prison litigation in earlier phases on single-judge courts.
That 116-page per curiam slip opinion dealt with the plight of 16o,ooo people
in the California prison system. The decision concluded that conditions of the
prisons, filled to "almost double" the operating capacity, rendered medical care
unconstitutionally deficient.7 9
77. The total of thirty-nine cases on the docket at that time included two from the state courts
and one under the Court's original jurisdiction. Thanks to Matthew Pearl, Victoria
Degtyareva, and Daniel Winik for compiling the data through coding judgments by judge to
gain information not provided readily on the various databases that track Supreme Court
decisions.
78. See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S- 9 0-0 5 20, 2007 WL 3046043 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 18, 2007); Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. Co1-1351, 2007 WL 2601391 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
2007).
79. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520, Co-1351, 2009 WL 2430820, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); see also Order To Reduce Prison Population, Nos. CIV S-
90-0520 LKK JFM P, Col-1351 TEH, 2010 WL 99ooo (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010),
appeal granted and jurisdictional consideration postponed sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130
S. Ct. 3413 (20o). The panel's opinion began with a discussion of the prison system in
disarray from overcrowding, resulting in "problems that every day threaten the lives and
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Including this three-judge court decision, seventeen of the thirty-six cases
on the Court's docket by way of the federal courts came from the Ninth
Circuit.so Four of those thirty-six were from the Fifth Circuit, three from the
Fourth Circuit, and two from each of the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Federal
Circuits. Judge Reinhardt was on six of the Ninth Circuit's sixteen; he wrote
the majority opinion for two, one of which was en banc, and was one of the
three signing the three-judge per curiam decision." Thus, within this small set,
Judge Reinhardt had the most decisions pending before the Court.
What are the issues in the cases on which Judge Reinhardt wrote or joined
panels that were, as of the summer of 2010, on the Supreme Court's docket? In
different ways, all six are about access to courts. The California prison
conditions litigation raised questions about the remedial authority of federal
health of California prisoners." Id. The court observed that as of "mid-2005, a California
inmate was dying needlessly every six or seven days." Id. (emphasis in original). Further, the
court found: "Thousands of prisoners are assigned to 'bad beds,' such as triple-bunked beds
placed in gymnasiums . . . , and some institutions have populations approaching 300% of
their intended capacity." Id.
So. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Cullen v.
Pinholster, 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010); Martin v. Walker, 357 F. App'x 793 (9 th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3464 (2010); Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167 (9th
Cit. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010); Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849
( 9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322
(2010); Ransom v. MBNA, 577 F.3d 1026 (9 th Cit. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2097
(2010); Richter v. Hickman, 578 F-3d 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 15o6 (2010); Milner v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 575 F-3d 959
( 9 th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010); Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820; Moore v.
Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Belleque v. Moore, 130 S. Ct.
1882 (2010); Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 562 F-3d 1oo2 (9 th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3350 (2010), and sub nom. Garriott v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010);
McCoy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, 559 F.3d 963 (9 th Cit. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 3451 (2010); Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010);
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 95o (9 th Cir. 2009), cert. granted
sub nom. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010); Humphries v.
Cnty. of L.A., 554 F-3d 1170 (9th Cit. 20o8), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1501 (2010); Omega S.A.
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089
(2010); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9 th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1878 (2010); Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3 d 865 ( 9 th Cit. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755
(2010).
81. The six cases are Pinholster, 590 F.3d 651; Laster, 584 F.3d 849; Richter, 578 F.3d 944; Moore,
574 F. 3d 1092; Winn, 562 F.3d 1002; and Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820. The two in which
Judge Reinhardt wrote the majority opinions are Richter, 578 F. 3d 944; and Moore, 574 F-3d
1092.
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judges under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995." Three others related
to the availability of federal habeas relief for criminal defendants. One involved
a defendant who pled guilty after his lawyer failed to move to suppress an
involuntary confession," and the other concerned a defendant whose lawyer
failed "to consult any forensic expert in blood evidence before settling upon a
defense strategy that excluded the use of expert testimony."8 1 The third case, in
which Judge Reinhardt joined the majority, dealt with a defendant sentenced
to death after his lawyer prepared minimally for the sentencing phase." All
three entailed detailed technical questions about the innards of the statutes and
doctrine governing habeas corpus, and yet-through the filter of convicted
defendants - they simultaneously implicated major issues of the allocation of
responsibility between state and federal courts, between trial and appellate
courts, and between lawyers and judges.
A fifth case, in which Judge Reinhardt joined the opinion written by Judge
Fisher, returns the Court to a series of decisions exploring indirect public
support of religious education.86 In this instance, the issue was the
constitutional validity of, and the standing of taxpayers to challenge, an
Arizona tax credit for scholarships, some of which supported religious
education." The sixth case pending before the Court-in which Judge
Reinhardt joined the majority opinion of his colleague Carlos Bea -was about
consumer access to courts. At issue was the enforceability of a form contract
clause that precludes class-wide arbitration, held by the Ninth Circuit to be
82. The questions before the Court in Coleman are whether the three-judge court had
"jurisdiction to issue a 'prisoner release order,"' and whether they had made the requisite
findings under, and sufficiently tailored the relief as required by, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 03-804, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to -75 (1996)
(codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 626 (2006)).
83. Moore, 574 F.3d 1092 (Reinhardt, J.).
84. Richter, 578 F. 3d at 956 (Reinhardt, J.). As framed by the Supreme Court, "[i] n addition to
the question presented, parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: Does
AEDPA deference apply to a state court's summary disposition of a claim, including a claim
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 .. . (1984)?" Harrington, 130 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
85. Pinholster, 590 F.3d 6s (Smith, Jr., J.). Chief Judge Alex Kozinski authored a dissent, joined
by Judges Pamela Ann Rymer and Andrew J. Kleinfeld.
86. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). Prior decisions on the issue include Board of
Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); and Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
87. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 562 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
nom. Garriot v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010).
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unenforceable under California law that was not, in turn, preempted by federal
arbitration law."
But a focus on Judge Reinhardt ought not to obscure that he is not the only
repeat-player appellate judge and moreover, looking back at other Terms, not
always at the top of the list of those whose cases went "up." A review of the
Supreme Court docket over just the last two and a half Terms makes plain that
Judge Reinhardt joins many other appellate judges also in regular conversation
with the Supreme Court. A few more numbers and names are therefore
required to inform this discussion about the construction of judicial voice and
of what factors contribute to Reinhardt's visibility.
Looking back to the 2009-201o Term, the Supreme Court decided seventy-
five cases from federal appellate courts.89 Once again, Judge Reinhardt's circuit
had the most cases selected: fifteen came from the Ninth, followed by eleven
from the Seventh Circuit, ten from the Eleventh Circuit, seven from the Second
and Sixth Circuits, and five each from the Third and Fourth Circuits, with the
remaining cases coming from the other circuits.9 o As for the repeat-player
judges, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook9  and Judges Richard Posner9 2 and
William Bauer9' of the Seventh Circuit participated-in majorities or
88. See Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010). In July 2010, the Second Circuit
reached a conclusion paralleling that of the Ninth Circuit on the unenforceability of a
contract ban on class arbitrations. See Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2010).
89. This count includes summary reversals, but not cases dismissed as improvidently granted.
go. SCOTUSBLOG, SCOTUSblog FINAL Stats OT o9-7.7.1o: Circuit Scorecard,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2oo/o7/Final-Charts-07071o-lo.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2010). Four of the decisions reviewed came from the Fifth, three from the
Eighth and D.C. Circuits, two from the First and Tenth, one from the Federal Circuit, and
eight from the state courts. Id.
91. Judge Easterbrook wrote the majority opinion in three cases. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567
F. 3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010); Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kucana v. Holder,
130 S. Ct. 827 (2010); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F. 3d 627 (7 th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130
S. Ct. 1418 (2010). He joined the majority in two cases. United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578
(7th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010); Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 528 F-3d 488 (7th Cir. 20o8), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
92. Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion in three cases. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578; United States v.
Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Lewis, 528 F-3 d 488. He
joined the majority in two cases. NRA, 567 F-3d 856; Smith v. City of Chicago, s24 F.3d 834
(7th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576 (2009). The vacated case
aside, the Supreme Court's majorities disagreed with Judge Posner in these cases.
93. Judge Bauer wrote the majority opinion in one case. Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F- 3d 703 (7th Cir.




dissents - on the most cases (five) decided that Term. Judge Ed CarneS94 of the
Eleventh Circuit and Judge Karen Nelson Moore's of the Sixth Circuit each sat
on four of the cases decided.
Indeed, in the set coming from the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt was not
much present; he was on two cases, for which he authored one majority
opinion and joined one panel decision.9' As for the Ninth Circuit's rulings, the
Supreme Court affirmed four,97 reversed or vacated nine,9' and affirmed in
opinion in four cases. NRA, 567 F.3d 856; New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd., 564 F.3 d 840 (7 th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2olo); Lewis, 528 F.3 d 488; and
Smith, 524 F.3d 834. Judge Bauer likewise joined his Seventh Circuit colleagues in meeting
disagreement at the Supreme Court.
94. Judge Carnes wrote the majority opinion in two cases. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 532
F.3d 1209 (iith Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010); United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d
1318 (ith Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010). The remaining two cases were decided
per curiam. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App'x 892 (ith Cir. 2009),
rev'd sub nom. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010); Carpenter v.
Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F. 3 d 1048 (1ith Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
95. Judge Moore wrote the majority opinion in one case. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F-3d 572
(6th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2olo). She joined the majority opinion in two cases.
Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F. 3d 523 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130
S. Ct. 13 (2009); Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3 d 326 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1382
(2010). In the remaining case, she filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Spisak v. Hudson, 512 F. 3 d 852 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct.
676 (2010).
96. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F-3d 682 (9 th Cir. 2008) (Smith, J.), rev'd sub nom. Hui v.
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010); Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 834 (9 th Cir. 2008)
(Reinhardt, J.), rev'd sub nom. Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam). Both
cases are discussed infra note loo.
97. Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
Washington's Public Records Act that made referendum petitions public), affd, 130 S. Ct.
2811 (2010); Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, v.
Kane, 319 F. App'x 645 (9 th Cir. 2009) (mem.) (rejecting First Amendment free speech and
expressive association challenges to a law school policy requiring all groups, including those
predicated on religion, as a condition of receiving official recognition, to accept all who want
to join as voting members), affd sub nom. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,
Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Espinosa v. United Student
Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that notice was sufficient, as a
statutory and constitutional matter, for student loan discharges in bankruptcy through
Chapter 13 plans), affd, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010); Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 8oo (9th Cir.
2008) (upholding the U.S. Bureau of Prisons' interpretation of a federal statute calculating
good-time credits), affd sub nom. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010).
gs. Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a court,
rather than an arbitrator, should resolve the threshold question of unconscionability of a
contract for mandatory arbitration), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (reading the contract's
delegation to an arbitrator to decide all disputes as precluding court decisionmaking on
unconscionability); Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009)
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part and reversed in part in two." In both of the Reinhardt cases that Term,
one about the failure to treat a detainee's known medical needs in an
(upholding as not an abuse of discretion an injunction against the planting of genetically
altered alfalfa pending the preparation of an environmental impact statement by the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service), rev'd sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (finding that Monsanto had standing and reversing the injunction as
an abuse of discretion); Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 557 F.3d 985 (9th
Cit. 2009) (determining that the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
which provided "default rules governing the inland rail leg of a shipment between a foreign
country and ... the United States," applied to "'a maritime case about a train wreck"'),
rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2433 (2010) (concluding that the Carmack Amendment was inapplicable);
United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9 th Cit. 2008) (concluding that a state law
violation is not necessary to sustain an honest services fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C.
5 1341), vacated per curiam, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (remanding in light of Skilling v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010)); Friend v. Hertz Corp., 297 F. App'x 690 ( 9th Cir. 2008)
(mem.) (using the "place of operations" test to determine corporate citizenship for diversity
jurisdiction), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010) (instructing the lower courts to
apply the "nerve center" test as the governing test for corporate citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
5 332(c)); Castaneda, 546 F.3d 682 (concluding that an immigration detainee can proceed
under Bivens for the government's failure to treat his lethal cancer), rev'd sub nom. Hui, 130
S. Ct. 1845 (holding that the Public Health Service Act precluded a Bivens claim against
Public Health Service employees who had been sued for acts undertaken as part of their
official duties by Castaneda's survivors for his injuries caused by the alleged constitutional
violations); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F-3 d 892 (9 th Cir. 2008) (holding
that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in text messages of a city police department
employee and that the department's search of text messages violated the Fourth
Amendment), rev'd sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (concluding
that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred because the city's review of its
employee's email was "reasonable"); Brown v. Farwell, 525 F-3d 787 (9th Cit. 2008)
(upholding a grant of habeas corpus to state prisoner on the grounds that DNA evidence
produced at trial was later proven to be inaccurate and misleading and, absent DNA
evidence, other evidence was insufficient to convict), rev'd sub nom. McDaniel v. Brown, 130
S. Ct. 665 (2010) (concluding that the district court should not have admitted new evidence
to discredit DNA evidence and that the state trial record presented sufficient evidence of
guilt); Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3 d 1o69 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 527 F. 3d 758 (9 th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a federal statute transferring public land in the Mojave National
Preserve, which bears a cross to honor World War I soldiers, does not cure the
Establishment Clause violation), rev'd sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010)
(sending the case to the courts below to determine whether, in light of the congressional
"policy of accommodation" evidenced in the statute, a violation of the Establishment Clause
existed and remedies were appropriate).
99. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F-3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (striking down as
violating the First Amendment portions of the "material support" sections of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 2004 amendment, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, on vagueness grounds), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding the material
support statute as not vague as applied to the activities of those challenging the provisions);




immigration facility and the other about rights to counsel for a habeas
petitioner, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed."oo
In the 2008 Term, the Supreme Court had a docket of eighty-three cases,
sixty-three of which were from the federal appellate courts."o' Once again, the
Ninth Circuit sent the most cases - sixteen - to the Court. The appellate judge
most often in this set of certiorari grants was Judge Kim Wardlaw, who sat on
five.'o2 Judge Reinhardt followed, sitting on four cases, one of which
overlapped with Wardlaw."o3 In the four cases in which he participated, Judge
trial court erred in not ordering arbitration and concluding that a claim of tortious
interference with contract fell outside the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010) (holding that a dispute about the ratification
date of a collective bargaining agreement was to be decided by the district court and not an
arbitrator, even as the claim of tortious interference claims were not, as the appellate court
had concluded, cognizable).
oo. In Castaneda, 546 F.3d 682, the Ninth Circuit had held that a detainee's survivors could
bring a Bivens claim for tragic failures to treat his cancer. The Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that a federal statute precluded the Bivens claim. Hui, 130 S. Ct. 1845. In
Belmontes, 529 F.3d 834, the Ninth Circuit upheld a habeas petitioner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and concluded that prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to present
available mitigating evidence during a capital sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court, per
curiam, reversed and concluded that no prejudice had resulted. Wong, 130 S. Ct. 383.
101. See SCOTUSBLOG, SCOTUSblog FINAL Stats OTo8-6.29.o9: Circuit Scorecard-OT o8,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2oo9/o6/circuit3.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2010). Fifteen came up through state courts, two from three-judge courts, and one from the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Id.
102. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1, 531 F-3 d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); linkLine Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th
Cit. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109
(2009); Hulteen v. AT & T Corp., 498 F.3d oo1 (9 th Cir. 2007) (en banc), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
1962 (2009); Ministry of Def. and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Cubic Defense Sys., Inc., 495 F.3d 1o24 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ministry of
Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 129 S.
Ct. 1732 (2009); Mizrayance v. Knowles, 175 F. App'x 142 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated and
remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009).
103. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 683 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a
preliminary injunction against the U.S. Navy's training exercises involving sonar based on
findings that the Navy's need to continue did not constitute "emergency circumstances"
within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act and that there was possibility
of irreparable harm to marine mammals), rev'd, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (reversing the injunction
for failing to appreciate that the balance of equities supported the Navy's actions); Hulteen,
498 F.3d 1001 (ruling that the calculation of credit for service to the corporation that
included all leaves for temporary disability, except pregnancy, taken prior to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) violated Title VII), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009) (holding
that the corporation's policy did not violate the PDA); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481
F.3d 1170 (9 th Cir. 2007) (holding that prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity
from suit on allegations of failure to develop policies and to train personnel on
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Reinhardt wrote one opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; in the
remaining three cases, he was on the panel. In all four, the view that Judge
Reinhardt espoused was reversed.104
Judges Betty Fletcher and Susan Graber of the Ninth Circuit also sat on
four of the cases that went before the Supreme Court; Judge Fletcher also met
with disagreement,' as did Judge Graber to a lesser extent.' As for the
judges participating in three or more decisions, they included Judges Marsha
Berzon,"o7 Ray Fisher,os William Fletcher,' 09 and Ronald Gould"o of the
constitutional obligations to preserve exculpatory evidence), rev'd sub nom. Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (holding that absolute immunity extends to that conduct);
Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F. 3d 671, 694-703 (9 th Cit. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(concluding that a state court's instructions to the jury on accomplice liability were
ambiguous and thus unconstitutionally relieved the government of its burden of proof),
rev'd sub nom. Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823 (2009) (holding that jury instructions
were not ambiguous and that, even if they were, the state court determination of
reasonableness had to stand under federal statutes dictating deference).
104. See supra note 103.
1o5. Winter, 518 F- 3d 658; United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3 d 781 (9 th
Cit. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009); Cubic Def Sys., Inc., 495 F. 3d i024; Flores v.
Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579
(2009).
106. The Supreme Court reversed Judge Graber in three cases. Hulteen, 498 F.3d 1001; Earth
Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3 d 687 (9 th Cir. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009); Se. Alaska Conservation Council v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 486 F. 3d 638 ( 9th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Coeur Alaska, Inc.
v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009). In the fourth case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the majority opinion, written by Graber. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523
F.3d 1078 (9 th Cir. 2008) (Graber, J.), afd, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009).
107. Flores, 516 F.3d 1140; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F. 3 d 781; Hulteen, 498 F.3 d ool.
108. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), afd in part, rev'd in
part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Hulteen, 498 F.3d ool; Cubic Def Sys., Inc., 495 F.3d io24.
iag. Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118 (9 th Cir. 2008),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009); Hulteen, 498 F.3d 1001; Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671 (9 th
Cir.2007), rev'd sub nom. Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823 (2009).
11a. Judge Berzon wrote the majority opinion in two cases and joined the majority in one. Flores,
516 F.3 d 1140; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781; Hulteen, 498 F. 3 d loo. Judge
Fisher joined the majority in two cases and wrote a dissenting opinion in one. Redding, 531
F.3 d 1071; Hulteen, 498 F.3d loo; Cubic Def Systems, Inc., 495 F.3 d 1o24;. Judge W. Fletcher
joined the majority in two cases and wrote the majority opinion in one. Osborne, 521 F.3d
1118; Hulteen, 498 F. 3d 1001; Sarausad, 479 F-3d 671. Judge Gould joined the majority in one
case and filed dissenting opinions in two cases. Redding, 531 F.3d 876; linkLine Commc'ns,
Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.




Ninth Circuit, Judge Bruce Selya of the First Circuit,1" Judge Jos6 Cabranes"'
and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor"' of the Second Circuit, Judge Allyson Kay
Duncan"' and former Judge Karen Williams"s of the Fourth Circuit, Judge
Emilio Garza of the Fifth Circuit," 6 and Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey of the
Sixth Circuit."'
In short, Judge Reinhardt is one of several judges who are repeat players
before the Supreme Court, and many have similarly high numbers of cases
reviewed during the brief period (chosen for its recentness and not tested for
typicality) of this snapshot. Before embracing a view of either a distinctive
Reinhardt or of a "Ninth Circuit effect," an econometric analysis would have to
take into account variables such as a circuit's relative size; the number of cases
assigned to senior judges, active judges, and those sitting by designation; the
changing composition of both circuit courts and the Supreme Court; the
allocation of work among the lower federal courts; and the kind of decisions
rendered.
iii. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F. 3 d 165 (1st Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 788
(2009); Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 5oi F. 3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008);
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S.
Ct. 1058 (2009).
112. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2008), aff'd, 129 S. Ct. 2230
(2009); Pyett v. Penn. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub
nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
113. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129
S. Ct. 2195 (2009); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
114. al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F-3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v.
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); Bell v. Kelly, 260 F. App'x 599 (4th Cir. 2008), dismissed as
improvidently granted, 129 S. Ct. 393 (2008); Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594 (4 th Cir.
2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009).
115. al-Marri, 534 F.3d 213; United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 2102 (2009); United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1079
(2009).
n6. United States v. Yeager, 521 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009); Kennedy
v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865
(2009); Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 325 (5th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Negusie v.
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
117. Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd,
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009); Bies v. Bagley, 519 F.3d 324 (6th
Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom., Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145 (2009); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't
of Nashville, 211 F. App'x 373 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
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To fill in a few of these data points, recall that the Ninth Circuit is the
largest circuit, comprised of nine states with a population of over sixty-one
million, just under one-fifth of the over three hundred million people now
living in the United States."' Looking at the overall docket of the federal
courts, between 300,000 and 350,000 civil and criminal cases" 9 and
approximately one million bankruptcy petitions"' are filed each year. Appellate
filings average around 60,000, and total dispositions run around that
number.' 2 1 (Most litigation takes place in state courts: as of 2007, more than
thirty-nine million cases were filed in state courts.1 22) Looking at another
snapshot-2008-the Ninth Circuit disposed of more than 13,000 cases, or
more than a fifth of the total federal appellate dispositions.1 2 3 The other high-
volume circuits that year were the Fifth Circuit, which disposed of more than
9000 cases, followed by the Second and Eleventh, each of which disposed of
more than 6ooo. 4
The number of dispositions, in turn, does not equate with the number of
opinions written, the number marked for publication, or the range of
substantive issues decided. For example, in 2009, the federal appellate courts
118. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 20o9 ANNUAL POPULATION ESTIMATE, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html. The figures were derived by
summing the Census Bureau's 2009 current population estimates for each of the nine states
to 61,204,820 and then dividing by the 2009 current population estimate for the United
States: 307,oo6,550.
119. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2008, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCase
loadStatistics2008.aspx, at tbls. C, D [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2008].
120. Id. at Table F (901,927 bankruptcy filings in 2008); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2009, at tbl. F, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCase
loadStatistics2009.aspx (1,202,503 bankruptcy filings in 2009) [hereinafter FEDERAL
JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2009].
121. FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2008, supra note 119, at tbl. B; FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS
2009, supra note 120, at tbl. B. Per the Administrative Office's practice, the figures in this
note and those that follow regarding appellate filings and dispositions do not include
statistics from the Federal Circuit, which sees around i5oo appellate filings per year and
disposes of approximately the same number. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2008, supra,
at tbl. B-8; FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2009, supra, at tbl. B-8.
122. See Shauna M. Strickland et al., State Court Caseload Statistics: An Analysis of 2007 State
Court Caseloads, Table i, available at http://wwv.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/
2007 files/StateCourtCaseloadStatisticsFINAL.pdf.





disposed of 59,604 cases"' and issued decisions for publication in under
seventeen percent. ,6  Publication does not, however, invariably predict
Supreme Court interest. In both the 2oo8-2009' and the 2009-2010 Terms12
125. FEDERAL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2009, supra note 120, at tbl. B.
126. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at tbl.S- 3, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/So3Sepo9.pdf (2010); see also Penelope Pether,
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal ofPrivate judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435
(2004).
127. United States v. Flores-Figueroa, 274 F. App'x 501 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that, to convict
of aggravated identity theft, the government was not required to prove that a defendant
knew the identity belonged to another person), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (concluding
that the government was required to prove defendant's knowledge); Bell v. Kelly, 260 F.
App'x 599 (4 th Cit. 2008) (denying federal habeas relief for a state prisoner who invoked
counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence), dismissed as improvidently granted, 129 S. Ct.
393 (2oo8); United States v. Boyle, 283 F. App'x 825 (2d Cit. 2007) (holding that the
government did not violate defendant's due process rights by asserting that a single robbery
was the predicate act of two different enterprises for a racketeering conviction), afd, 129 S.
Ct. 2237 (2009) (concluding that an association-in-fact racketeering enterprise must have a
"structure," but that the court's jury instructions need not use this exact language); Negusie
v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals'
finding that an alien was ineligible for asylum on the ground that he had worked as a prison
guard in Eritrea), rev'd sub nom. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (holding that
coercion and distress must be considered when evaluating whether the "persecutor bar"
applies to asylum claims); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
211 F. App'x 373 (6th Cir. 20o6) (holding that participation in an investigation was not
protected for the purposes of alleging a violation of rights under Title VII), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009) (concluding that Title VII's antiretaliation provisions protected responses to an
investigation of a coworker's complaint); Mirzayance v. Knowles, 175 F. App'x 142 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that a state court had erred and that a defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel when counsel advised him to withdraw an insanity plea), rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 1411, 1411 (2009) (concluding that the California decision rejecting the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was not "contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law").
The practice of issuing summary decisions as well as labeling some "not for publication" has
drawn a good deal of academic attention. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not
Making Law, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157; Deborah Jones Merritt &
James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
128. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. App'x 332 (4 th Cir. 2009) (holding that,
because a party's only claim in ERISA litigation was for long-term disability benefits, which
the district court did not award, the party was not a "prevailing party" and, thus, not
entitled to attorney's fees), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2152 (2010) (concluding that, under 29
U.S.C. § 132(g)(1), a district court has discretion to award attorney's fees to a nonprevailing
party in ERISA litigation as long as the party had "some degree of success on the merits"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 330 F. App'x 892
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the Supreme Court granted review in six cases in which the federal appellate
courts have not thought the issues worthy of published decisions.
Visibility of judges comes not only from whether the Court takes the case
but also from what the Court does with the judgment below. As already noted,
in the two full Terms considered here, a majority of the Court disagreed with
Judge Reinhardt's views in each of the six cases on which he sat-twice
unanimously, once by a 7-2 decision, and three times in a 6-3 decision. '2
(Responding to mention of such exchanges with the Court, Judge Reinhardt
once commented: "A lot of the times when we have been reversed we have
been applying the law as it is, and they're reversing it, which they are allowed
to do."'30 )
Even these variables miss another: voice. An illustration of a persistent
jurisprudential narrative tone in Reinhardt's corpus can be found in a 2003
decision. At issue was the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's 2002
opinion in Ring v. Arizona,'3' holding that the Constitution required juries
rather than judges to decide the facts underlying those "aggravating
circumstances" that are a predicate to capital sentencing. An en banc decision of
the Ninth Circuit, written by Judge Sidney Thomas, held that retroactivity was
(ith Cir. 2009) (holding that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), an amended
complaint may relate back to the original action only when the amending party was
mistaken about the defendant's identity and that the district court did not err in finding that
the amended complaint did not result from mistaken identity), rev'd sub nom. Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2010) (concluding that "relation back under
Rule is(c)(i)(C) depends on what the party to be added knew or should have known, not
on the amending party's knowledge"); Christian Legal Soc'y of the Univ. of Cal, Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Kane, 319 F. App'x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), affd sub nom. Christian Legal
Soc'y of the Univ. of Cal, Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)
(discussed supra note 97); Lett v. Renico, 316 F. App'x 421 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding the
district court's determination that the Michigan court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
by declaring a mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict and retrying the
petitioner), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010) (concluding that the Michigan Supreme Court's
application of federal law was not unreasonable); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 308 F. App'x 696 (4th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming the district court's denial of a state prisoner's 42 U.S.C.
5 983 claim on the basis of the district court's determination that the prisoner's injuries were
de minimis), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner's excessive
force claim under 5 983 must be decided on the "nature of the force rather than the extent of
the injury"); Friend v. Hertz Corp., 297 F. App'x 690 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1181 (2010) (discussed supra note 98).
129. See supra notes loo, 103.
130. Adam Liptak, AJudge Known for Pushing the Envelope, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/o6/3o/national/3oJUDG.html.




required."' Judge Reinhardt concurred, endorsing the majority opinion and
objecting to the dissent's view of nonretroactivity. He described the dissent as
arguing that
additional people should now be put to death following
unconstitutional proceedings even though the Court has recognized the
unconstitutionality inherent in those future executions ... . To me, this
represents a seriously warped view of the nature of our legal system,
and the relationship of that system to its ultimate objective: justice."
For Reinhardt, the state could not "deliberately execute persons knowing that
their death sentences were arrived at in a manner that violated their
constitutional rights,""' as doing so would be to tolerate a profoundly arbitrary
system in which a person's challenge to capital punishment turned upon the
happenstance of where his or her case sat in a court's queue."s
In the U.S. Supreme Court, four Justices agreed with Judge Reinhardt that
retroactivity was required. Their dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, explained that the Ring rule was
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' implicating fundamental fairness,"
and was "'central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt,' such that
its absence 'create[d] an impermissibly large risk that the innocent [would] be
convicted."" 6 The dissenters saw factfinders in death penalty cases to have "a
special role that can involve, not simply the finding of brute facts, but also the
making of death-related, community-based value judgments," and hence rights
going to the accuracy of determinations and not only the procedure for them
were at stake.' 7 But the majority decision, authored by Justice Scalia, rejected
those propositions. Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas, Justice Scalia held that Ring was not to be applied to
cases already final on direct review.1, 8 For them, the issue was procedural
132. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3 d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1124.
135. Id. at 1124-25.
136. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 359 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting excerpts
from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-13 (1989)).
137. Id. at 361.
138. Id. at 358 (majority opinion). On remand, the same en banc panel (with one substitution) of
the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas and overturned the death sentence on ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds. Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cit. 2005). As the
opinion by Judge Thomas explained: "The net result was that Summerlin presented no
affirmative evidence and no rebuttal evidence, although . . . there was an abundance of
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rather than substantive, and its relationship to accuracy too attenuated to
support retroactive application. 9
This brief excursion into the exchanges between appellate and Supreme
Court jurists underscores that audience and speakers interactively shape
understandings of the import of opinions. Teasing out relationships among
individual judges, kind of case, outcome at the circuit level, and Supreme Court
rulings requires analyses of a host of variables, simply sketched here. The
socio-legal import is yet another question, turning on one's understanding of
the relevant law, facts, and (per Judge Reinhardt) justice of opinions - all
requisite to forming conclusions about how to assess the Supreme Court's
approval or disapproval of particular decisions of lower court judges.
V. CONSTRUCTING LEGAL VIRTUE
This account has, thus far, detailed Reinhardtian traits of facticity, patience
with legal and factual nuances, thoroughness, preparation, optimism, and an
unembarrassed embrace of the judicial role as justice-seeking and as protective
of all persons. Another facet of his analytic stance bears attention: his efforts to
shape norms about what constitutes a good judge in this polity.
Reinhardt is a sophisticated jurist who understands well what Rogers
Smith has called the "conflicting visions of citizenship in U.S. history." 4 o As
Smith explained, despite de Tocqueville's account of "liberal democratic
features" of "American political culture," 41  American legal history is
constituted from multiple traditions, some welcoming vulnerable minorities
and others deeply inegalitarian. Statutes and case law not only insist on equal
treatment but also instantiate "forms of second-class citizenship, denying
available classic mitigation evidence concerning family history, abuse, physical impairments,
and mental disorders." Id. at 635. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 547 U.S. 1097
(20o6). Following a resentencing hearing, Summerlin was sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Summerlin appealed, raising issues regarding
his original trial and his factual innocence. An Arizona appellate court denied the appeal.
State v. Summerlin, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0074, 2009 WL 3116831 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2009).
i99. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356-57. As Justice Scalia put it, "The evidence is simply too equivocal to
support" the conclusion that "judicial factfinding so 'seriously diminishe[s]' accuracy that
there is an 'impermissibly large risk' of punishing conduct the law does not reach." Id. at
355-56 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13)-
140. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(1997).




personal liberties and opportunities for political participation to most of the
adult population on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and even religion."'4 2
Reinhardt is a self-conscious member of the political elites, identified by
Smith as participants in struggles over the meaning of American law.
Reinhardt consistently draws on one of the "rival civic ideologies,""' that of an
unapologetic liberal egalitarianism. Reinhardt maintains that "wholly aside
from one's personal or religious beliefs, there is a universal wellspring of social
justice in the United States - a wellspring that constitutes a wholly appropriate
foundation for judicial decision-making."'" Reinhardt's reading of the
Constitution requires dismantling the barriers that Smith detailed-of
disenfranchisement and of disentitlement also claiming a lineage in American
constitutionalism and legalism. Knowing full well that many called "judge"
aspire to a model that is "increasingly . . . technocratic proceduralist,"'
Reinhardt offers a counter-image of judges committed to elaborating legal
rules recognizing individuals at risk in relationship to power. His is an evolving
social order that - as he appreciates - is already remarkable for its dedication of
high-profile individuals (judges and justices on federal and state courts),
obliged to speak to individuals in their encounters with law.
Reinhardt's efforts to shape this understanding of civic values are anchored
in another of his attributes: his commitment to open acknowledgement by
judges of their world views. In an article addressing whether judges should
give speeches, Reinhardt argued that "judges should speak directly to the
public," as part of a "dynamic discussion surrounding this country's
developing conception of rights and liberties."'4 6 Hence, a hallmark of his
work-in speeches and opinions-is forthrightness. Reinhardt is a proponent
of what Jeremy Bentham called "publicity""' and what Reinhardt terms "a
duty to be open and forthcoming with the public, and, correlatively, to subject
142. Id. at 2. Smith's conclusion stemmed in part from a review of statutes from 1798 through
1912 on "fourteen dimensions of U.S. citizenship laws" and a survey of some 2500 cases. Id.
at 4.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Reinhardt, Social Justice in Judging, supra note 57, at 20.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Stephen Reinhardt, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 8o5, 8o6
(1995) [hereinafter Reinhardt, The Open Judiciary].
147. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale for Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice
(1827), in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 191 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William
Tait 1843); see also Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, From 'Rites' to 'Rights' ofAudience: The
Utilities and Contingencies of the Public's Role in Court-Based Processes, in REPRESENTATIONS OF
JUSTICE 195, 197 (Antoine Masson & Kevin O'Connor eds., 2007).
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ourselves to criticism just like all the other members of a democratic society."'*8
(As Bentham put it, a judge, while presiding at trial, is also "under trial." 49)
That "duty" results in our knowing what Reinhardt thinks about the
obligations of judges. He explained his posture in the context of praising his
colleague, Judge Noonan, whose opinions, Reinhardt wrote, "exude a passion
for social justice for ordinary people-workers, immigrants, and the
underprivileged."' As Reinhardt also noted, what he admired in Noonan is
what he shared: "This commitment to social justice is. central to his, and my,
understanding of how courts should conduct their business."s15
Thus, to read Stephen Reinhardt is to see on display "the premise that
minority rights are a fundamental part of our nation's ideals and constitute a
core element of our American democracy.""s2 Reinhardt implements this
precept by forcing us to encounter persons arguing for these ideals. His
authority comes from his thoroughgoing engagement with the facts and laws
as applied to such individuals, and it is these traits that make him an exemplar
of justice worthy of imitation -for those now selecting judges and for those
now sitting as judges.
Why should one hold him up as a model? Because an analysis of
Reinhardt's jurisprudence necessarily entails discussion of individuals like Juan
Antonio Perez, Kim Ho Ma, Kevin Phelps, and Falen Gherebi, who serve here
as placeholders for hundreds of persons whose experiences have, via
Reinhardt, become part of the annals of American law. Their travails -from
judges ignoring people standing literally before them to judges avoiding the
legal claims advanced and acceding to the prospects of indefinite detention or
refusing to remedy facts of sanctioned degradation and torture -return me to
the idea invoked at the outset: exempla iustitiae.
The Renaissance narratives were about judges who put the state's law
before themselves, at times at great personal expense. Reinhardt is equally loyal
to law but conceives that mandate to oblige loyalty to "Justice" and "Welfare" -
the words he chose to italicize when writing about the preamble to the U.S.
Constitution.' What Judge Reinhardt is willing to do is to face the possibility
of state injustice as well as to hope for its fairness and generosity. Thus, he not
only is an exemplary jurist but one who also gives to us the exempla iustitiae of
148. Reinhardt, The Open Judiciary, supra note 146, at 8o5.
149. BENTHAM, supra note 147, at 355.
ISO. Reinhardt, Social Justice in Judging, supra note 57, at 18
151. Id.
152. Id. at 22.




Perez, Kim Ho Ma, Phelps, and Gherebi - standing as painful warnings about the
harms incurred when justice has gone astray.
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